The resilience of religion in developing countries is now plain to see. In Africa, religion shows no sign of disappearing or diminishing in public importance, as development theorists have generally supposed. The European Union has normally excluded consideration of the religious dimension in formulating development policies towards Africa. This article explores the possible role of religion in Africa's development. It looks at a number of specific fields that are widely debated in the literature on development to consider ways in which religious ideas may be relevant to development thinking. It concludes with some general considerations on how policymakers might be able to encompass religion as a factor in their strategic outlook. L'impact de la religion dans les pays en développement est maintenant évident. En Afrique, la religion ne montre aucun signe de disparition ou de déclin, comme les théoriciens du développement l'ont généralement présumé. L'Union européenne a, en principe, exclu la prise en compte de la dimension religieuse dans la formulation de politique de développement envers l'Afrique. Cet article étudie le rôle potentiel de la religion dans le développement de l'Afrique. Il s'intéresse à un certain nombre de thèmes largement débattus dans la littérature sur le développement afin de considérer les voies au travers desquelles les idées religieuses pourraient être pertinentes pour la pensée sur le développement. Il conclut avec des considérations générales sur la façon dont les hommes politiques pourraient prendre en compte la religion dans la conception de leurs stratégies.
INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest surprises of recent decades has been the resilience of religion. Many classic works of social science considered the 'disenchantment' of the world -to use Weber's phrase -as an inevitable accompaniment of the rise of modern states and modern economies; classic theories of development (Leys, 1996) paid no attention to religion, simply because it seemed irrelevant to the processes they were analysing other than, perhaps, as an obstacle to modernisation. The European Union -and its predecessor, the European Community -has habitually based its development policies on this assumption. The present article argues in favour of giving attention to the role of religion in development, marking a new type of relationship between the European Union and Africa.
The need to rethink some earlier assumptions concerning the relation between religion and development in the broadest sense has been apparent for some time, most notably since the Iranian revolution of 1979. The latter event made clear that, at the very least, religion cannot be regarded as a force destined to retreat from public space in any society that aspires to a high degree of technological achievement or of sophistication. Since then it has been increasingly easy to find evidence of the dynamic role of religion in the public sphere in many parts of the world, and not only in what used to be known as the Third World. Examples of momentous political change in which religious forces and institutions have played a significant role include Poland, South Africa and the Philippines. They have also marked indelibly the history of the United States. Since the events of 9/11, the political role of religion has been the subject of worldwide debate. In regard to sub-Saharan Africa, religion played a role in deadly political and social conflicts even before 9/11, most obviously in Sudan and Nigeria. Since then, the sub-continent has sometimes been viewed as a new theatre of the 'war on terror' proclaimed by the US government.
Violent conflict, whether or not connected to religion, is generally recognised as an impediment to development. However, the role of religion in political conflict should not obscure its possible role as a significant factor in the development process (Ter Haar, 2005a) , as we will discuss in the remainder of the present article. In subSaharan Africa, religion now forms arguably the most important connection with the rest of the world (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004; cf. Bayart, 2000) . The potential role of religion as an agent of development in this vast area has not escaped some leading European donor institutions. The Commission for Africa convened by the government of the United Kingdom gave substantial attention to the role of religion in its 2005 report entitled Our Common Interest (Commission for Africa, 2005: 127-9) . The UK government's own development arm, the Department for International Development (DFID), realising the importance of doing further research on this subject, has initiated a project called Faiths in Development, a multi-million pound research consortium. Similarly, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has instituted a Knowledge Forum on Religion and Development Policy, and other European donor institutions, including some non-governmental organisations, are also known to have undertaken initiatives intended to explore the possible role of religion in the development process. 1 The potential role of religion in regard to development has been discussed for some years now even by the main international financial institutions concerned with development, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Marshall and Keough, 2004; Marshall, 1998; Tyndale, 2001a Tyndale, , 2001b .
All of these initiatives can be understood as part of a wider shift away from a narrowly economic paradigm of development. The concept of human development is now widely accepted. Human development, according to the United Nations Development Programme, 'is about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests' (UNDP website). It thus refers to people's resources beyond any purely material and technocratic aspect. Most policymakers today accept that sustainable development can be achieved only if people build on their own resources. Logically, these assets should be considered to include not only intellectual and social resources, but also spiritual ones, if and when these are available. It is a fact that large numbers of people, particularly in developing countries, have a religious outlook on the world, in a sense that we briefly discuss below.
Moreover, it has become common in development cooperation to emphasise the importance of true partnerships in fostering a cooperation whose binding forces are said to be 'solidarity and mutual respect' (Commission for Africa, 2005: 89) . If this is indeed so, it implies taking seriously people's world-views and considering their potential for the development process as a whole. There are in any case eminently practical reasons for including religion within a broad concept of development, since religion provides a powerful motivation for many people to act in the ways they do. It equips many of the world's people with the moral guidance and the will to improve their lives. Whether one regards religious belief as itself 'true' or 'untrue' is hardly the point here. We wish simply to argue that religion, whatever form it takes, constitutes a social and political reality.
The question, then, is whether religious and spiritual resources produce a type of knowledge that is, or could be, relevant to development. One does not need to profess any religious belief, or to be religious in any sense, in order to explore this matter, as we intend to do in the present article. Our approach is broadly secular and sociological inasmuch as it does not imply that either the authors or readers of this article are required to share the religious world-views that we describe.
In the following paragraphs we will first consider how the concept of development may be viewed through the prism of religion and we will discuss what actually constitutes religion for most people in the developing world, including Africa. We will then move on to examine the role religion could play in specific areas of policy, including some that are specified by the Millennium Development Goals. It is particularly appropriate to debate such matters with regard to Africa, not only because it is the continent considered in greatest need of development, but also because it contains an enormous diversity of religious and spiritual traditions, whose potential for development has hardly been considered.
RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT
A major obstacle to investigating the role of religion in development is a widespread misunderstanding about what religion actually is (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: ch. 1) . For most people in the world, including in Africa, 'religion' refers to a belief in the
existence of an invisible world, distinct but not separate from the visible one, which is home to spiritual beings that are deemed to have effective powers over the material world (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: 14) . For people who hold this point of view, the invisible world is an integral part of the world, which can not be reduced to its visible or material form only. For them, the material world is linked to the spirit world, through the human spirit that is believed to be inherent in every person; hence, a regular traffic is believed to take place between the human and the spirit worlds. In such a holistic perception of the world, it follows that people's social relations extend into the invisible sphere. In the same way as they try and maintain good relations with their relatives, neighbours and friends for their own benefit, individuals and communities invest in their relations with spiritual entities so as to enhance the quality of their lives. Thus, people all over the world enter into various forms of active communication with a spirit world in such a way as to derive information or other resources from it with a view to furthering their material welfare or interests.
The above definition of religion fits Africa particularly well. Nevertheless, other definitions of religion exist, derived from different contexts. In modern Western societies, including in the European Union, religion is generally conceived rather differently. Religion is often equated exclusively with its institutional expression, which arises from the history of the Christian churches in Europe. Presumably for this reason, standard works on Africa's modern history generally consider religionif at all -in the form of organised religion, focussing for example on the role of the church in state politics. Moreover, definitions of religion in the West tend to frame religion in terms of the ultimate meaning that it is deemed to provide to human existence. (This is a definition particularly associated with the German-American theologian Paul Tillich, 1959) . Definitions couched in such terms do not necessarily require a belief in invisible beings, such as gods, deities or spirits.
It is ironic in this regard that religion can be considered to be the historical point of departure for the modern concept of development. The Indian economist Deepak Lal considers all social science models to be 'actually part of a culture-specific, proselytizing ethic of what remains at heart western Christendom' (Lal, 2001: 3; Lal, 1998) . Development, too, may be placed in this category inasmuch as it has incorporated a vision that is specifically Christian in origin, and that still bears the traces of its genealogy. Briefly, Christians traditionally believe in the prospect of a new and perfect world that will come into existence with the return of Christ to Earth. Over several centuries, politics and states in Europe assimilated these originally Christian ideas of perfection (Burleigh, 2005) . The cooptation of religious ideals by states and by political movements led in the twentieth century to a variety of political projects that have been helpfully described as 'coercive utopias', secular ideologies that aspire to create a model society (Brzezinski, 1993: 17) . With hindsight, we may consider 'development' to have been one of the many coercive utopias of the twentieth century imposed by modern states that have adopted some of the character and techniques of religion.
The modern idea of development may be seen, then, as the secular translation of a millenarian belief, once general in Europe, concerning the construction of a perfect world. Inherent in this thinking are an aspiration to eliminate evil in all its forms from the earth and the belief that human beings will, eventually, be able to achieve this goal. Typical of modern secular thought -and inherent in the modern idea of development -is a related belief in progress. This, too, ultimately reflects a Christian idea of humankind as pilgrims on the road in their final destination, where life will be as originally intended by its creator. In Europe, this religious notion of progress has become secularised in recent centuries and, more recently still, it has become limited to a view of material progress only.
In western Europe in particular, the secularisation of society has caused many people to overlook the original connection between religion and the notion of development. People who are religious, however, are more likely to make this connection. From a religious perspective, orthodox interpretations of development have notable shortcomings. Development experts, one commentator observed already a quarter of a century ago, seem to religious believers as 'one-eyed giants', who 'analyse, prescribe and act as if man could live by bread alone, as if human destiny could be stripped to its material dimensions alone' (Goulet, 1980: 481) . A Dutch development economist has noted that development workers pay too much attention to the final goals rather than to the actual path by which these are achieved. In similar vein, he has identified a number of other contrasts between secular and religious approaches to development (Goudzwaard, 2004) . For present purposes, we do not wish to endorse, or even analyse, the criticisms most often heard from religious people in regard to development. We wish only to establish that such criticisms exist and have a bearing on the theory and practice of development.
Historically speaking, people in all parts of the world have assimilated and adapted notions of development that were originally conceived in Europe and that were exported largely through colonial rule. Various societies have brought, and still bring, their own ideas to notions of development and progress. These ideas are often articulated in a religious idiom, not least because the notions of development and religion have so much in common. They both contain a vision of an ideal world and of the place of humans therein. It is not difficult to find examples of the ways in which people's religious understanding of the world may have a bearing on development. The traditional Hindu idea of humankind, for example, emphasises harmony with the living environment. This easily translates into a view that economic growth should be integral to the well-being of the environment as a whole. Similarly, Muslims believe that the ultimate aim of life is to return humanity to its creator in its original state of purity. In African traditional religions, the pursuit of balance and harmony in relations with the spirit world is paramount. Charismatic Christians (of which there are large numbers in Africa and in developing countries more generally) believe that personal transformation -inner change -is the key to the transformation of society. All of these ideas help to shape people's views of development. They stem from intellectual traditions associated with particular religions that have been formed by local histories.
In Africa, local histories include recent experiences of colonialism and nationalism, and often of authoritarianism and single-party rule as well. These were the historic vehicles for policies of development that, in the case of Africa, have almost invariably been conceived by their architects in a secular mode. In other words, actual development practices have generally not conformed to ideas that are central to the continent's various religious traditions. We are not arguing that conforming to religious notions will automatically lead to better outcomes or better practices in matters of development. All we are arguing is that, for effective development cooperation, it is necessary to take people's own understanding of the world as a point of departure. The potential of religious ideas in the relationship between the European Union and Africa has hardly been explored by secular actors, either in regard to development or any other matter. While development agencies have certainly worked with religious institutions and their leaders in many situations, notably in the fields of education and public health, they have devoted far less attention to the religious ideas that underlie the behaviour of religious believers and communities.
For analytical purposes, religious resources may be divided into four major categories, which can be applied to all the religious traditions in the world, in different constellations of importance. Religious ideas (what people actually believe) are one such category. Others are religious practices (ritual behaviour), religious organisation (how religious communities are formed and function), and religious -or spiritual -experiences (such as the subjective experience of inner change or transformation) (Ter Haar, 2005a: 22-7) . All of these elements produce knowledge that, in principle, could be beneficial to a community for development purposes. Many communities in Africa make spontaneous use of their religious resources in a variety of ways, a few of which we will briefly consider.
EXPLORING RELIGION FOR DEVELOPM ENT
In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss a number of topics that are widely debated in the literature on development, and which are also evoked in the Millennium Development Goals. In each case, we give some brief examples from Africa of how religious ideas are relevant to development.
Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
There is general agreement that the large number of armed conflicts in Africa is a serious obstacle to development. Insofar as conventional international approaches to conflict prevention and resolution take religion into account, they tend to focus on the institutional aspects of religion. This particularly privileges the former mission churches, which, apart from having efficient bureaucracies, articulate a vision of the world in a language familiar to secular development experts, due to these churches' continuing close relations with Europe.
The fact remains, however, that for many Africans, religion is perceived primarily in terms of interaction with a spirit world. This aspect of religion is hardly considered by international organisations engaged in peacebuilding. Yet ideas concerning a spirit world play a major role in both legitimising and discouraging violence. In many of Africa's wars, fighters seek traditional medicines or other objects or substances that are believed to be channels of spiritual power. These are presumed to make the people who possess them effective in battle or to protect them from injury (Ellis, 2001) . The persons who dispense such medicines exercise influence over the fighters, and in some cases this can take on a clear institutional form.
In Sierra Leone, for example, a militia was formed during the civil war of the 1990s that played a crucial role in subsequent events. This armed force, composed of fighters known as kamajors, was organised along the lines of the country's traditional initiation societies, popularly known as 'secret societies'. These secret societies initiate young people into adulthood, a process whereby they are considered to 'die' as children and to be reborn in a new form, as adults with new responsibilities. This process is associated with the acquisition of esoteric knowledge that is not to be divulged to non-initiates. Initiation involves direct interaction with a spirit world by ritual means. During the war, senior officials of the country's most influential traditional secret society, Poro, acted as initiators of young men as fighters in the kamajor militia. This is not an isolated case, as similar uses of religious initiation for military purposes have been widespread in recent wars in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Congo and elsewhere. The spiritual aspects of such military movements are essential to their very nature, and therefore have to be addressed if these movements themselves are to be understood (cf. Lan, 1985) .
There are many African countries today in which state security forces have lost any realistic claim to a national monopoly of violence, and where locally organised vigilantes or similar groups proliferate and sometimes receive a degree of official sanction. The kamajors, for example, were part of an officially-recognised Civil Defence Force instituted by the Sierra Leonean government in 1997, and indeed the recognition of this new force was one of the factors that led to a coup by sections of the armed forces in May of that year. Some people saw the kamajors as heroes in fighting against an atrocious enemy, while others consider them to have been perpetrators of major human rights violations themselves. Whatever the case, it is clear that they enjoyed a real popularity in some communities and had ties to local stakeholders. These relationships were largely expressed in traditional religious form.
By the same token, the end of armed conflict in Africa is often accompanied by religious rituals designed to cleanse fighters from the pollution of bloodshed. This is not always done through traditional means, but may also take an Islamic or Christian form. In Liberia, charismatic churches often provide a forum where former childsoldiers can confess their crimes and, in a religious idiom that recalls the symbolism of traditional initiation, can be reintegrated into society. One 11-year old former fighter, for example, having been 'born again' in Christ, said he had 'taken an oath never to kill again. I'm now a complete born-again Christian and a child of God' (Osagie-Usman, 1994) . It is interesting to note that the same idiom of being born again is central to both traditional initiation societies and charismatic Christianity. A rather different example of the use of religion in resolving conflict concerns South Africa, where the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was led by an Anglican archbishop and was closely associated with the country's faith communities. The work of the TRC was based on the idea that long-term reconciliation depends crucially on religious notions of reconciliation and healing, even in the absence of formal justice. Although the TRC has been criticised in South Africa itself, its ultimate success or failure will only become apparent with the passage of time. In the meantime, however, the TRC model has been widely imitated. Truth commissions have subsequently been created in Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where they have had a mixed record, and have been mooted in many other countries.
Almost invariably, traditional peacemakers in Africa base whatever authority they have on some form of spiritual legitimacy. There have been attempts to identify traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and harness them to international diplomatic initiatives (Zartman, 2000) . Nevertheless, international efforts at peacemaking and peacebuilding in Africa have rarely involved such authorities for purposes of peace and reconciliation to any significant degree. Still less attention has been given to the fact that traditional peacemakers may at the same time be organisers of war, such as the officials who initiate young men into a sodality like the kamajors and give them medicine believed to make them strong in battle by providing them with spiritual power.
Throughout Africa, the power attributed to religious experts is considered morally ambivalent, in the sense that their supposed spiritual power can be used both to harm and to heal. People who are believed to possess spiritual power can be organisers of violence as well as potentially helping to resolve conflict. This is one reason why traditional peacemaking techniques cannot be regarded by diplomats or international conflict resolution activists simply as an adjunct to a peace process that is conducted primarily through conventional diplomatic and political channels. It is commendable for diplomats, whether from the European Union or any other putative peacemaker, to include the most prominent religious figures in their programmes. However, they need to communicate with a far wider range of religious authorities, including both traditional spiritual authorities and leaders of the new religious movements that are flourishing in Africa (Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2005) . These have to be included in a regular programme of consultation and discussion with a view to preventing and understanding conflicts as much as resolving them.
Governance
Religion is part of the social fabric for most of the world's people. Many voluntarily associate themselves with religious networks, which they use for a variety of purposes -social, political and economic -that go beyond the strictly religious. Interestingly, many religious networks in Africa survive largely or entirely from tithes or other monies donated by their members: in effect, their ability to tax their own members or supporters is testimony to the success of many religious organisations in developing a close bond with their adherents, and shows a degree of accountability to them. This stands in sharp contrast to the problems of revenue collection that are faced by states in Africa, often heavily reliant for their revenue on dues levied on import -export trade, or on external sources of funding, including aid. Most African states have a poor record in the collection of taxes from their own populations, making them unhealthily dependent on foreign sources of finance rather than on their own populations. The relationship between a state and its domestic tax-payers is an important element of real citizenship, so often observed to be lacking in African states, and so often felt to be an important ingredient in improved governance.
The question arises, then, whether religious networks are not assuming some of the functions normally attributed to government, and whether this tendency may not increase in future. This is most relevant to the considerable number of African countries where the state exercises little real authority outside the main cities or a handful of nodal points, and where states have very little ability to tax their nominal citizens. Something of the sort is clearly happening in the fields of health and education especially, where religious organisations have taken over responsibilities for welfare services that failing states can no longer fulfil. Many of the best-rooted non-state organisations have an explicit religious basis, whether it is in the form of educational establishments run by churches or by Muslim networks or, as mentioned, in vigilante movements underpinned by traditional initiation societies.
On closer inspection it is also apparent that many Africans in fact debate key political questions, including the fundamental legitimacy of their own governments, in religious or spiritual terms. It is important to note in this respect that a leader who is believed to have harnessed the power of the spirit world is widely seen as legitimate (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: ch. 5 ). 'Spiritual' legitimacy, however, does not necessarily coincide with democratic legitimacy. This insight concerning the nature of the spirit world can not readily be gleaned from the academic literature on development, generally unfamiliar with the symbolic language of political legitimacy in Africa. Such language is far more easily visible in the popular literature, videos and other published material that circulate all over the continent and that are widely consumed and discussed (e.g. Haynes, 2006) . Many publications of this sort discuss what in more conventional language are considered problems of governance, crime and morality (Ellis and Ter Haar, 1998) . In popular discourses, these problems are typically viewed as manifestations of evil, and debated not in the jargon of development, but in what might be termed a 'spirit idiom'. The latter, like any unfamiliar language, has to be learned if it is to be understood.
Hence, in the considerable number of African countries in which government through efficient, centrally-controlled bureaucracies is clearly inadequate to ensure the country's security, or to raise sufficient resources through taxation to fund the reproduction of the state itself, or to ensure a minimum level of welfare for the country's people, non-state organisations are destined to play a much greater role in future. This is almost certain to involve institutions of a religious nature and may be expressed in an idiom that is unfamiliar to many secular development agents.
Wealth Creation and Production
It is widely acknowledged that religious ideas played an important part in the development of capitalism in the history of Europe (Weber, 1992; cf. Tawney, 1964; Buchan, 1997) . This was not primarily as a result of direct action by religious institutions, but through the influence of religious ideas on people's thinking concerning the legitimacy of wealth and the moral value of lending, saving or investing money, for example. It is by no means inevitable that other continents will develop along the same lines as Europe did, but recalling Europe's history does have the merit of helping to illustrate the significance of current religious ideas in developing countries in forming people's ideas about wealth. A good example is the emergence of the so-called 'prosperity gospel' in African charismatic churches. The label 'prosperity gospel' has been applied by Western analysts to a strain of theology that considers financial success and material wealth as a gift of God to believers, and that these can be achieved by faith and prayer. This is a controversial subject, since some authors consider the prosperity gospel primarily as a form of wishful thinking or a distraction from more urgent business (Gifford, 2004) . For an example from the Muslim world of religious networks that have become closely associated with economic entrepreneurship, the Mourides of Senegal constitute a case that has been well documented (Cruise O'Brien, 1971) .
Any talk of economic production in Africa has to take account of the central importance of land. At present, some two-thirds of people south of the Sahara live in rural areas, and many of these derive their living in part from agriculture, directly or indirectly. Although it is risky to generalise about a sub-continent as large and diverse as sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear that many countries will not emerge as industrial producers or with internationally competitive service sectors in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it remains as important as ever that agriculture be encouraged, notwithstanding the formidable obstacles ranged against it. These include desertification and climate change, the agricultural policies of governments in the European Union and the USA, and the tendency of many African governments, for political reasons, to favour urban sectors at the expense of ruraldwellers.
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People's ideas about the proper use and ownership of land, too, are often expressed in terms of religion. This may take the form of a belief that land is made fertile by the spirits of ancestors. Religious beliefs of this sort are often seen as obstacles to development, such as in those places where traditional forms of landholding preclude women from ownership of land or even place taboos on the ownership of agricultural implements by women, despite the key role they often play in cultivation. There are also many examples of traditional chiefs having the authority to grant land while retaining the right to recall its use, powers that are evidently open to abuse. In some cases, particular ethnic groups may traditionally be forbidden from owning land but may enjoy usufruct rights only. This principle has in fact played a role in violent conflicts in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. 3 All of these are examples of traditional concepts concerning landholding that may offend against current ideas concerning universal human rights. They may also be in contradiction to Western-style systems of individual land tenure guaranteed by law. It is thus no solution to argue for the preponderance of traditional forms of landholding over modern ones inspired by Western models. Rather, what is required is to consider what elements of traditional thought, characteristically expressed in a religious or spiritual idiom, might usefully be adapted for development purposes. This reflection must consider contemporary ideas of justice and human rights as well as modern demands of agricultural efficiency. Much more research is necessary on the religious aspects of this matter.
Health and Education
Throughout Africa, there is a widespread supposition that people in need of healing include not only those with obvious physical ailments, but also those who are suffering from vaguer problems that in clinical medicine might be diagnosed as psychological problems, including stress or depression. In Africa, both illness and healing are generally viewed as holistic in nature, requiring attention to the spiritual as well as physical aspects of a person. For this reason, religion plays an important role in health care in Africa generally. This strongly suggests the need to integrate spiritual ideas into health-care policies.
Analysis of people's ideas about health may also reveal a great deal about popular perceptions of relations between donor countries and Africa. For example, although the means by which HIV/AIDS is transmitted are widely understood, Africans often suggest that the disease may have been deliberately exported to the continent by Western countries intent on depopulating Africa, or that 'aid' and 'AIDS' are related phenomena. Such ideas are clearly misguided, but they do reveal a great deal about how many Africans perceive their relationship with the West (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: 45 -7) . Whatever one's opinions of these views, development policy needs to take account of them. Differences in perceptions of illness and healing sometimes lead to outcomes that surprise Western analysts, such as the occasionally progressive role played by traditional imams, in Mali and elsewhere, where even conservative clerics have been prominent in the fight against AIDS.
Generally speaking, health and education constitute an area in which the role of religious institutions has already been widely noted by development experts, notably in the field of service delivery. The scope of religious institutions in welfare provision is currently further expanding through the rapidly-growing activity of Islamic non-governmental organisations (NGOs) throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The total number of Islamic NGOs operating south of the Sahara, according to one leading source, increased from 138 out of a total of 1,854 NGOs in 1980, to 891 out of 5,896 20 years later (Salih, 2002: 11) . Many of the most dynamic Muslim NGOs nowadays combine proselytisation with the provision of welfare services and even a high standard of technical education, rather as Christian missionary organisations have traditionally done. Some modern Islamic schools in West Africa offer business studies and computer courses as part of their curriculum (LeBlanc, 1999: 493 -4) , as do some modern Christian institutions, particularly in charismatic circles (Larbi, 2001: 347 -8) .
The rise of Islamic NGOs often causes nervousness among Western governments due to the suspicion that any form of Islamic activism could be tainted by association with terrorism. Development officials need to discriminate clearly between Islamic NGOs or other organisations that can play a constructive role in development and the small number that are inclined towards violence. A sensible way for the European Union to do this would be to work with Islamic NGOs wherever this is feasible, learning what they do, and gaining an ability to distinguish those that are relevant for development purposes from those that are not. This is particularly important in view of the vast numbers of Muslims in Africa.
These four sketches, drawing on African examples, are intended to illustrate the potential for religion in promoting development in key policy areas. As we have noted, it is widely accepted in policy circles that any effective and lasting development should build on people's own resources. These include, we argue, not only material and intellectual resources, but also people's religious or spiritual resources.
NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
If poor countries are to develop, it is not so much new policy instruments that are needed, but rather a new vision of what development means, and how it should be implemented. People's full range of resources should provide the foundation for any development strategy. Among these, we have argued, are people's religious and spiritual resources. They play a role in each of the four areas examined in the previous section -the need for peace and security, the quality of governance, economic growth, and health and education -widely considered as key to development. This is not only a matter of intellectual interest, but also of practical value. In many of Africa's poorest countries, effective, centralised bureaucracies hardly exist. Some of the countries in this condition are commonly referred to as 'failed states' or 'poor governance countries', recently defined by the US National Intelligence Council (2005) as 'those where basic government institutions have decayed to the point where they cannot make governance decisions'. In countries of this type, power is, literally, dis-integrated. It becomes a matter of necessity rather than choice to consider how development could be enhanced by using the resources in society at large. Many of the communities or social networks that carry the burden of development have a religious form or convey religious ideas in some sense. In any event, some theorists of globalisation argue that communities throughout the world are now becoming 'network societies', ceasing to be organised along characteristically modernist lines (Castells, 1998) . Moreover, some observers with experience of African politics believe that restoring peace and order to conflict-torn regions will require networks of governance that transcend the boundaries of sovereign states (Sawyer, 2004) . In Africa, the continent with the greatest number of 'failed states', the lack of effective bureaucracies has a particularly deep historical resonance. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region where religion traditionally played a central role in governance, prior to the imposition of colonial government modelled on European ideas concerning the separation of religion and politics. Africa's traditional forms of government were associated with relationships between individuals and social groups, usually expressed in what we refer to above as a 'spirit idiom'. Authority over the spirit world thus translated into authority over people, making religion an outstanding means of instrumentalising political power by dominating webs of relations over a wide area. Hence, political power was traditionally exercised through essentially religious techniques which enabled rulers to command material aspects of power, such as armed force and rights of taxation. These older traditions of governance continue to have an effect on African politics today (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: 24) .
In view of this historical background, the question arises how, in practical terms, religious networks or institutions could contribute to development. It is important to emphasise that religious networks cannot be considered as a simple substitute for an effective bureaucracy. Regarding such networks primarily as implementers of development plans may be useful at times, but does not itself amount to the fundamental rethinking of development policy that we are advocating. New strategies in development cooperation should take the spiritual dimension of a community into account, for example by supporting faith-based organisations at the grassroots level, not regarding them as service-deliverers only, but also affirming them in positive aspects of their spiritual vision (Cordaid et al., 2006) .
As with civil society more generally, religious networks or institutions do not constitute a 'magic bullet', the missing element that can make policy successful in the absence of an efficient state or other bureaucracy. If religious networks are to make a positive contribution, it can only be in the context of a different strategy on the part of development organisations themselves. This also applies to the European Union, whose Economic Partnership Agreements are based on conventional strategies that take little account of Africans' world-views. The key to using the human resources vested in social networks for purposes of development is the establishment of long-term partnerships between external development agents and social networks in Africa. Given the importance of religion in Africa, this must include religious networks. It is encouraging to note in this regard that the formation of long-term partnerships is one of the stated goals of the Commission for Africa (2005: 370 -71) .
However, there are at least two major characteristics of international development bureaucracies that militate against long-term approaches of the sort advocated. First, international development officials, like other functionaries, tend to derive prestige from the size of the budgets they administer. A senior official of a development agency typically has a budget of millions of dollars at his or her disposal, and an administrator with a smaller budget is likely to derive correspondingly less prestige. But in many African situations quite small amounts of money are often preferable to large amounts, as African societies have only a limited capacity to absorb capital (cf. Rimmer, 2003) . Second, desk officers or unit directors based in Western capitals (or even in the African capital cities) may have little time and inclination to spend long periods becoming acquainted with key members of religious networks and establishing the mutual trust that is necessary to develop ideas together. In other words, if the development of Africa is to be taken seriously, it will require at least some categories of Western officials to change their mode of operation quite fundamentally.
If development were to be based on long-term partnerships with a strong social component, this would have implications not only for Africa, but also for donor countries in the European Union. European governments and other donor bodies that, we are suggesting, will need to explore the role of religion in development, are all, to a greater or lesser extent, secular bodies that respect a formal separation between the spheres of religion and politics. Institutions such as DFID and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs that have recently launched research projects on religion and development risk causing offence to some people in their own countries (and even some of their own employees) by their initiatives, since public opinion in Europe generally considers the rigorous separation of church and state as a matter of principle. Hence, both DFID and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically point out that their wish to investigate the potential role of religion in development should not be taken to imply that they have themselves abandoned their secular nature and outlook.
Even with such a disclaimer, however, any sustained attention to the role of religion in development is bound to change the nature of donor institutions in time. This matter is all the more delicate in that -uncomfortably for European donor countries -development problems are clearly related to questions of international migration. These days substantial numbers of people from the developing world live in Europe, where religious ideas and networks that are conspicuously global in outlook help to sustain African diasporas. Through remittances, African migrants in Europe make a major contribution to the economies of their countries of origin (Manuh, 2005; Ter Haar, 2005b) . Part of these remittances find their way through religious networks that link Africa and Europe, providing an infrastructure that could be used for development purposes. Traditional mainline churches are the most obvious example of this, having solid historical connections in Africa as a result of their missionary past. Furthermore, many churches created in Africa itself nowadays have missionary branches in Europe . Muslim networks show similar features, especially with the rise of Islamic NGOs funded from Arabia and the Gulf states. At the same time, some Africa-based Muslim groups have shown themselves equally adept at creating new religious networks in Europe. There are even African traditional religious believers that have created networks overseas. The development potential of African religious networks in Europe has hardly been explored.
There is thus a strong link between the development of Africa, the position of African migrants in Europe, and the ease of communication and movement between the two continents. Diasporas play a substantial part in the politics of many African countries, and contribute to their economies through the provision of remittances. As has become painfully evident, religious networks among diaspora communities in Europe can also pose problems of a political and social nature. This is particularly the case because politics and public administration in Europe have evolved over a long period on the basis of a separation of the spheres of religion and politics. This is a further reason why involving religious networks in development will have an effect on donor countries themselves, since it will bring European governments into a new relationship with religious networks among African migrant communities. CONCLUSION We have argued in this article that religion, widely acknowledged as an emerging force in world affairs, has the potential to play a positive role in the development process, as some European policymakers are beginning to perceive. We have briefly described the role that religion could play in regard to four sectors acknowledged to be of importance in development policy.
We have emphasised that this is not a plea for adding religious institutions or networks to the list of existing instruments by which development policies are implemented. Rather, the core of the argument here presented is that European development policy needs to be rethought in terms of the world-views of those most immediately concerned, the very people whom development policies seek to assist. In Africa, religion is central to people's world-views. The growing role of religion in public space in Africa represents a form of historical continuity with the continent's deeper past (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: ch. 9 ). Should policymakers and development agents pursue a path of greater cooperation with religious networks, it will mean lending serious attention to religious world-views, with which they may be unfamiliar or even feel uncomfortable. This last point needs to be considered in the light of the observation made by one analyst that many of the major flaws in the development process arise from a failure to consider the metaphysical questions concerning human life (Tyndale, 2001b: 3) . In effect, these should provide the framework for any serious debate about the aims of development, about how to measure progress, and how to understand the 'good life'.
Taking the development potential of religion seriously would have major consequences not only for the terms in which development is considered, but also for forms of government in Europe itself. We are not suggesting that European governments renounce the principle of separation of church and state, so hard-won in European history; we propose only that they consider anew how to shape the relationship between politics and religion. The fundamental reason for this is the continuing importance in Africa of religion, in the sense that we have defined it.
N O T E S

